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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NO. 17 606

STEVEN L. MALAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JAMES

c.

LEWIS and BRETT LEWIS,

Defendants and Respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for personal
injuries arising out of an automobile accident wherein
appellant was a guest.
DISPOSITION BELOW
Based upon a stipulation entered into by the
parties, the District Court of Weber County determined
that the defendant-respondent was entitled to a Summary
Judgment against the plaintiffs of no cause of action on
the plaintiff's Complaint.
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-2RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent requests that the judgment
of the District Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent disagrees with the statement of facts
set forth in appellant's brief to some extent.

Partic-

ularly, respondent disagrees with appellant's statement
relative to the fact that the appellant will have to
wear a leg brace for the remainder of his life, or to
the extent of his injuries claimed.

These facts,

however,

are immaterial to the issues involved in this appeal.

The

appellant acknowledges that he was a guest in the respondent's vehicle and that the Guest Statute, if valid, would
be dispositive of his claim.

The only issue on appeal

involves a constitutionality of Section 41-9-1, Utah Code
Annotated, the Utah Automobile Guest Statute.

(R.40-41).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
Even though the appellant has not designated his

argument point by point, it would appear that the argument raised in the appellant's brief is that the Utan
Automobile Guest Statute is unconstitutional in that it
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 1, of the United States Constitution,
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-3and also the Equal Protection Provision of the Utah
State Consitution, Article I, Section 2, and tnat it
further violates Article I, Section 7, and Article I,
Section 11, as well as Article I, Section 24.

Appellant

does not, however, cite this court's decision of Cannon
v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (1974) in which basically all of
those same arguments were made by the appellants, and
rejected by this court.

Instead, the appellant has

relied upon the decision of the California Supreme Court,
Brown v. Merlo, 106 Cal Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212, to question the constitutionality of the Utah Guest Statute;
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated.

In Brown, the

California Supreme Court held the California Guest Statute unconstitutional as being violative of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and the California
Constitutions.

The arguments advanced in appellant's

brief are substantially the same as were adopted by the
California Supreme Court.
by this

Those arguments were rejected

court in the Cannon case, and have also been

rejected by the Supreme Courts of the United States as
well as numerous state Supreme Courts.
In approaching the ultimate issue to be decided,
the court should bear in mind that all presumptions
favor the constitutionality of any legislative enactment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-4It has been stated many times by this court that a
statute is presumed to be constitutional unless it
clearly violates some specific provision of the constitution; that if any reasonable construction can be made
to harmonize the statute with constitutional provisions,
it will be so construed; that the party questioning a
statute has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality;
that a constitutional violation must be clear, complete
and unmistakable; and that constitutionality of a statute
transcends its destruction unless so obviously unreasonable
as to have no basis for its existence.

State v. Acker,

26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; Allen v. Rampton, 23 Utah
2d 336, 463 P.2d 7; Branch v. Salt Lake County Service
Area #2, 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814; Norton v. Department of Employment Security, 22 Utah 2d 24, 447 2d 907;
Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah
2d 431, 436 P.2d 958.

Thus the question presented is

not whether it is possible to condemn the Act, but
whether it is possible to uphold it.
In interpreting the Constitution of the United
States,

this court cannot look to the State of California,

but must look to tne United States Supreme Court as its
primary authority.

It is interesting to note that the

appellant makes no mention of the United States Supreme

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5Court cases in his brief.
this very issue.

Yet that court has spoken on

The leading case is Silver v. Silver,

280 U.S. 118, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929), wherein
the constitutionality of the Connecticut Automobile
Guest Statute was questioned.

It was argued in that

case that the statute created an unreasonable classification between automobile guests and other types of
guests.

In rejecting that argument, the United States

Supreme Court held as follows:
"The use of the automobile as an
instrument of transportation is parculiarly the subject of regulation.
We cannot assume that there are no
evils to be corrected or permissible
social objects to be gained by the
present statute. We are not unaware
of the increasing frequency of litigation in which passengers carried
gratuitously in automobiles, often
casual guests or licensees, have sought
the recovery of large sums for injuries
alleged to have been due to negligent
operation.
. • . Whether there has been a
serious increase in the evils of vexatious litigation in this class of
cases, where the carriage is by automobile, is for legislative determination,
and, if found, may well be the basis of
legislative action further restricting
the liability.
Its wisdom is not the
concern of the court.
It is said that the vice in the
statute is not that it distinguishes
between the passengers who pay and those
who do not, but between gratuitous pass-
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-6-

engers in automobiles and those in other
classes of vehicles. But it is not so
evident that no grounds exist for the distinction that we can say a priori that the
classification is one forbidden as without
basis and arbitrary.
Granted that the liability to be imposed
upon those who operate any kind of vehicle
for the benefit of a mere guest or licensee
is an appropriate subject of legislative
restriction, there is no consitutional
requirement that a regulation, in other
respects permissible, must reach every class
to which it might be applied--that the
legislature must be held rigidly to the
choice of regulating all or none . . . In
this day of almost universal highway transportation by motorcar, we cannot say that
abuses originating in the multiplicity
of suits growing out of the gratuitous
carriage of passengers in automobiles do
not present so conspicuous an example of
what the legislature may regard as an evil,
as to justify legislation aimed at it, even
though some abuses may not be hit . . • It is
enough that the present statute strikes at
the evil where it is felt and reaches the
class of cases where it most frequently
occurs."
Thus, the Connecticut Guest Statute was upheld.
Many years after the Silver case decision, a constitutional challenge was made in the State of Illinois
against the Illinois Guest Statute.

The Illinois SuprEme

Court held the statute to be constitutional in the case
of Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E. 2d 229
(1944).

The decision was appealed to the United States
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-7Supreme Court in Clarke v. Storchak, 332 U.S. 713, 64
Ct. 1270, 88 L.Ed. 1555 (1944).
decision was affirmed.

s.

Again, the state court

In a one sentence per curiam

decision, the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, citing Silver v. Silver as the
controlling authority.
It is significant to note that since the Silver
case, eleven states, including California, have recently
held that Guest Statutes are not unconstitutional; Illinois,
Texas, Iowa, Utah, Delaware, Oregon, Colorado, Nebraska,
South Dakota, Alabama, and California.
Since the decision in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d
855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212, the California
Court sitting en bane in Schwalbe v. Jones, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 321, 546 P.2d 1033 (1976), has held that a reenacted
guest statute denying recovery to the owner-passenger of
an automobile except in cases of intoxication or willful
misconduct of the driver is not unconstitutional in denying equal protection of the law.

In this case, the Cal-

ifornia Court held that in making a distinction between
owner-passengers and non-owner-passengers the legislature
may take into consideration the fact that the owner
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generally has the right to direct and control the driver
and as such there is a reasonable basis for the distinction.
As a practical matter, an owner sitting as a passenger probably can exercise no right of control in most
accident situations.

Accidents simply occur too quickly

to allow an exercise of a right of control.

In reality,

it seems that the California Court has awakened to the
idea that it could not substitute its wisdom for the
wisdom of the legislature in determining whether a law
is or is not desirable.

The Schwalbe court said:

Plaintiffs, in order to sustain their
position that Section 17158 denies them
equal protection of the laws, must not
be content to argue that the above reasoning was unwise, or that the purpose of
the Legislature could have been better
furthered by another means. Nor is it
enough for them to show that the lawmakers, in addressing similar problems
in similar areas, have made dissimilar
judgments.
The burden cast upon them is
that of demonstrating that the means
chosen by the Legislature were irrational
or that the purpose which they furthered
was not a legitimate legislative concern.
This they have not done. As the foregoing
analysis indicates, the Legislature, pursuing the clearly legitimate goal of
achieving a fair distribution of liability
for damage caused by unreasonable conduct,
concluded that the owner of a motor vehicle, whether he drives it himself or
selects another to act as his chauffeur,
should not recover for injuries sustained
by him due to the negligent operation of
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-9that vehicle--especially in light of the
fact that in the case of the surrogate
driver any such recovery would be at the
expense of the driver. We may disagree
with this conclusion, but we cannot brand
it as beyond the pale of reason.
To do
so would be to seriously erode our constitutional function. We conclude therefore that the motion for nonsuit on the
negligence count was properly granted.
Since an owner-passenger furnishes his car,
there is an excellent argument that he gives compensation and is in fact a passenger for hire.

Is it

reasonable to do as California has done and say that
owner-passengers cannot recover and that gratuitous
guests can?

Should a court substitute its wisdom for

that of the legislature, as California has done, or
should it not?
A number of law review articles, American Law
Report Annotations, and cases from other states are
cited in support of the appellant's proposition.

However,

the appellant fails to cite the Utah Supreme Court
decision of Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (1974), in
which the exact same constitutional arguments relied
upon by the appellant were raised and fully argued in
the consolidated cases decided under the Cannon decision.
This court framed the issues involved in the Cannon
case in the first paragraph of its decision where the
factual and legal circumstances were stated as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-10"The appeals of the plaintiffs,
which arose out of separate and
unrelated actions, have been consolidated since they involve one common
question of law, namely, was Section
41-9-11, U.C.A. 1953, unconstitutional?
Each plaintiff, while a guest in a motor
vehicle, moving upon a public highway
in this state, sustained personal injuries
in a vehicular accident.
Each plaintiff
initiated an action against his host,
the driver of the vehicle, to recover
damages for the negligent operation of
the vehicle.
Each host asserted Section
41-9-11, U.C.A. 1953, as a defense and
denied liability.
Each plaintiff urged
unsuccessfully before the trial court
that the Guest Statute, 41-9-11, U.C.A.
1953, denied him equal protection of the
law under the Constitution of the United
States (Fourteenth Amendment), and the
Constitution of Utah (Article I Section 24) ."
A reading of the appellant's brief, even though
the arguments are not set out point by point, makes
it abundantly clear that the gravamen of the plaintiff's
attack on the Guest Statute is exactly the same as tne
gravamen of the attack of the Guest Statute in Cannon.
The constitutional attack under both the United States
Constitution and the Constitution of Utah is the same in
this case as it was in the Cannon case.
This court,

in rejecting the various arguments

raised in the Brown case, and refusing to adopt the law
of the Brown case, pointed out,

in Cannon, that while

the California court in the Brown case found as an
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aspect of irrationality of the statutory classification
that numerous statutory exceptions had rendered recovery
under the Guest Statute largely fortuitous in view of
the various circumstances in which the statute was not
applicable, such a problem did not exist with regard to
the Utah Statute.

Furthermore, this court said, the

Equal Protection Clause does not compel the State to
either attack every aspect of the problem or to refrain
from any action at all, but, instead, it is sufficient
that the State's action be rationally based and free
from invidious discrimination.

The law of the case

adopted in Cannon, which is still the law of the State
of Utah, can be readily defined in two short paragraphs
found on pages 888 and 889 of the decision, respectively,
where it is stated:
"Section 49-9-11, U.C.A. 1953, was
enacted to provide some protection to a
generous host, who is sued by his invited
guest for ordinary negligence, when the
rider has given no compensation as an
inducement for making the trip or furnishing the carriage for the rider.
This act
subserved a valid legislative purpose to
encourage hospitality in the use of the
public highways. Furthermore, the automobile guest in this jurisdiction is not
placed in a distinct classification, where
he alone as a recipient of generosity is
deprived of the duty of due care by his
host."
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"The interpretation of the Guest
Statute by this court has averted the
alleged irrationality in the statutory
classification which disturbed the court
in Brown v. Merlo.
Furthermore, the Equal
Protection Clause does not compel the
state to attack every aspect of a problem
or to refrain from any action at all; it
is sufficient that the State's action be
rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination."
Equal Protection, of course, requires that classifications be reasonable and not arbitrary, and have a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.
ification.

There must be a rational basis for the classThe Utah Statute does not purport to single

out any particular group or give any special treatment
to anyone.

It applies to all operators of motor vehicles

and their guests.

None are excluded.

All persons who

ride as guests in such vehicles are precluded from
recovering from injury, death, or loss caused by the
driver's ordinary negligence.

All people who accept

transportation in a motor vehicle as guests without payment are included.
Appellant has suggested that the purpose of the
Guest Statute is to protect hospitality and to prevent
collusive lawsuits.

These objectives, although belittled

by the appellant, have been considered proper by the
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-13tribunal of our land as well as by numerous state Supreme
Courts as previously cited,
of the State of Utah.

including the Supreme Court

It must also be noted that the

protection of hospitality is not limited to the automobile
guest.

This same principle has traditionally run through

many fields of law; for example, the gratuitous bailee
and the bailee for hire,

the common carrier and private

carrier, the inkeeper and the ordinary host, and the trespassor and the business invitee.

The protection of

hospitality has been ingrained into our legal system.
As stated in the case of Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn.
371, 143 A. 240,
"There is inherent justice in the
requirement that one who undertakes to
perform a duty gratuitously should not
be under the same measure of obligation
as one who enters upon the same undertaking for pay."
Nor is it unusual for the legislature to pass
special legislation applicable only to automobiles.

The

automobile itself provides a basis for classification.
Examples of such legislation not applicable to other
fields of tort law are laws that make the owner of a
vehicle responsible for the negligence of minors (41-2-22,
Utah Code Annotated); laws imposing requirements for
driving automobiles (41-2-1, et seq.

Operator's and
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-14Chauffeur's Act); and special laws providing for the
service of process upon non-resident motorists (41-12-8,
Utah Code Annotated).

Would appellant claim all such

laws to be discriminatory because they relate only to
automobiles?

Automobile guests typically enter voluntarily

and remain for relatively brief periods of time.

The auto-

mobile statutes do not discriminate invidiously against
any permanent, identifiable group of persons.

They apply

equally to all persons who are guests in automobiles.
While it is believed that the foregoing authorities and
argument have covered all aspects of the appellant's
attack, the appellant has made the same argument under
other unspecified sub-headings to the effect that the
Guest Statute violates the Uniform Operation Provisions
of the Utah State Constitution, and also violates the
constitutional section providing that all courts shall
be open and that every man shall have a remedy by due
course of law for injury done to him in his property,
person, or reputation.

In addressing those arguments

the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Behrens v. Burke,
229 N.W. 2d 86 (1975) states as follows:
"Nor does this statute violate
the due process guarantee of Article IV,
Section 2.
That clause, we believe,
is applicable to the facts before us
only so far as it grants every person
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-15the right to a hearing on his
inclusion in the class affected
by the statute.
Article IV,
Section 20, is inapplicable since
"it is a guarantee that 'for such
wrongs as are recognized by the
law of the land the court shall
be opened and afford a remedy.'"
Simons v. Kidd, 1949, 73 s.o. 41,
38 N.W. 2d 883.
The guest statute
declares that injury suffered by a
guest because of a host's negligence
are not caused by 'wrongs as are
recognized by the law of the land.'"
In essence, then, the court is saying that the
constitutional provision guaranteeing that the courts
will be open to every person for all injury done to him
does not give a cause of action for negligence to a
guest, but only such causes of action as other guests
would have.

The Guest Statute does not preclude a cause

of action for injury to a guest.

It merely changes the

nature of proof required to support a cause of action.
In Behrens, the court said a statute should not be
declared unconstitutional unless the infringement on
constitutional rights leaves no reasonable doubt.

The

court then said,

"* * * We believe the classification and the effect of the
statute are reasonably geared to
these purposes. We cannot believe
that the Guest Statute can never
act as an incentive to free transportation; we cannot believe that
the Guest Statute does not prevent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16recovery in lawsuits that could
be characterized as ungrateful;
nor do we believe we are entitled
to question the wisdom of the
substative legislative decision
that those who do not compensate
their host drivers are not to
receive the protection of the
negligence standard.
We hold the
South Dakota Guest Statute does
not violate Article IV, Section 18."
The same issues raised in the Cannon case have
been before this court on two subsequent occasions in
Thomas v. Union Pacific RR Company, (Utah)
(1976), and Critchley v. Vance,
(1978).

(Utah)

548 P.2d 621

575 P.2d 187

Not only did this court expressly reject the

constitutional arguments raised by the appellants in
this case,

it has on those two subsequent occasions

reaffirmed that position, and refused to change its
ruling relative to the constitutionality of the Guest
Statute.

This court made it clear in the Thomas case

and the Critchley case that the re-examination of the
act should be left to the legislature.

For the reasons

stated in those cases, as well as others cited in this
brief, it is respectfully submitted that if the Guest
Statute is to be repealed that the act of repealing it
must be left to the legislature of the State of Utah,
and that this court should not retreat from the position
heretofore announced in Cannon, Thomas, and Critchley.
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-17CONCLUSION
The Guest Statute is not unconstitutional under
the Constitution of the State of Utah or of the Constitution of the United States.

The appellant's attack of

the constitutionality of the Utah Guest Statute should
not be considered in view of the recent consideration of
this question by this court in Cannon v. Oviatt, supra,
Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad, supra, and Critchley
v. Vance, supra.
DATED this -~1~St=h day of _ _ ___,,,J._.u...l...,'j,___ _ , 19 8 l •
Respectfully submitted,
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